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The paper presents a tractable general equilibrium model of search unemployment that 
incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by 
random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms offer 
wages, and possibly sick pay, so as to maximize expected profits, recognizing that the 
compensation package affects the queue of job applicants and possibly the absence rate as 
well. Shocks to the value of leisure among nonemployed individuals interact with their search 
decisions and trigger movements into and out of the labor force. The analysis provides a 
number of results concerning the impact of social insurance benefits and other determinants 
of workers’ and firms’ behavior. For example, higher nonemployment benefits are shown to 
increase absenteeism among employed workers. The normative anlysis identifies externalities 
associated with firm-provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative 
policies. Conditions are given under which welfare equivalence holds between publicly 
provided and firm-provided sick pay. Benefit differentiation across states of non-work are 
found to be associated with non-trivial welfare gains. 
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Worker absenteeism is a pervasive feature of employment relationships. In
many countries, sickness absence represents an underutilization of the labor
force of a magnitude comparable to unemployment. Data from Sweden and
Norway over the period 2000-2004 show that sickness absence amounted to
7-8 percent of contractual work hours. The Netherlands is another country
where sickness absence appears to be high relative to other countries.1
Absence from work has many sources, some predictable by both the
worker and the ﬁrm, and some predictable by neither the ﬁrm, nor the
worker. In the present paper we present a general equilibrium analysis of
employment and nonemployment where sickness absence, or absence for
short, is incorporated as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism in our
model is triggered by random shocks to the worker’s utility function that are
private information to the worker. Although there are institutions in place
whereby employers and insurance providers try to verify health conditions,
perfect monitoring is bound to be prohibitively costly.
Previous research on sickness absence has almost exclusively been empir-
ical and typically focused on how the individual worker responds to changes
in sick pay or other plausible determinants of absence. Brown and Sessions
(1996) provide a survey of the literature. There is by now considerable evi-
dence that increased generosity of sickness beneﬁts tends to increase absence
rates; see, for example, Allen (1981), Johansson and Palme (1996, 2002) and
Henrekson and Persson (2004). Time series data from some countries, no-
tably Norway and Sweden, reveal markedly pro-cyclical absence rates. Arai
and Skogman Thoursie (2005) as well as Askildsen et al (2002) provide ev-
idence and interpretations of pro-cyclical absenteeism in those countries.
There is not much evidence on the prevalence and determinants of sickness
reporting among unemployed individuals, however. The scanty evidence
there is indicates higher prevalence of reported sickness among unemployed
individuals than among employed workers (see Larsson, 2004, for evidence
on Swedish data).
Theoretical work on sickness absence is rare and has typically elaborated
on the static neoclassical model of labor supply. Ehrenberg (1970) is a sem-
inal paper where labor demand considerations are also taken into account.
The paper by Barmby et al (1994) proposes an eﬃciency wage model. Other
theoretical contributions include Coles and Treble (1996) and Chatterji and
Tilley (2002), who emphasize the interactions between absenteeism and pro-
1Nyman et al (2002) contain international comparisons of sickness absence based on
data from the labor force surveys. Se also Barmby et al (2002).
2ductivity.
Our analysis of absenteeism in a search equilibrium framework is new
in the literature. It derives from the notion that absence from work in a
frictional labor market is fundamentally diﬀerent from being “absent” from
the labor force. A worker on sick leave has typically unrestricted access
to his or her job. That is, the worker can return to work more or less
instantaneously without having to engage in costly search. By contrast, a
nonparticipant is restricted by labor market frictions and must compare the
beneﬁts of entry to the costs of search, recognizing the randomness of job
oﬀers.
The supply side of our model relates to some existing multistate models
of labor force dynamics. Toikka (1976) is a seminal paper and other contri-
butions include Flinn and Heckman (1982) as well as Burdett et al (1984).
Those papers provide partial equilibrium analyses in the sense that wages are
taken as given. Individual search and labor supply decisions are examined
in stochastic environments, allowing for nonparticipation as a distinct state
in addition to employment and unemployment. The value of nonmarket
activity is taken as a random variable and individuals choose nonparticipa-
tion for suﬃciently favorable realizations of nonmarket productivity. The
more recent contribution by Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) takes this ap-
proach into a general equilibrium setting by incorporating endogenous wage
determination.2
The framework we propose can be used to shed light on a number of
issues. For example, we can show how changes in sickness beneﬁts aﬀect
employed workers’ absence decisions as well as nonemployed workers’ search
decisions. We can also illuminate how those changes impact on ﬁrms’ wage
and recruitment decisions. Analogously, we can show how nonemployment
beneﬁts aﬀect not only behavior among the nonemployed but also absence
behavior among employees. Welfare policy interdependencies can thus be
analyzed in a coherent general equilibrium framework. As noted by Krueger
and Meyer (2002), not much research has been devoted to interactions be-
tween social insurance programs.3
Our model also relates to recent empirical work on how absenteeism re-
2The model by Garibaldi and Wasmer (G & W) has some technical similarities with
our model but there are also important diﬀerences. G & W focus on risk neutral workers,
whereas we assume risk aversion and thus have a motive for income insurance. G & W
consider bargaining over wages whereas we have wage posting by ﬁrms. G & W do not
allow for absence from work as a distinct labor force state as we do.
3See Larsson (2002) for an empirical study that focuses on interactions between unem-
ployment insurance and sickness insurance.
3sponds to employment protection rules. Ichino and Riphahn (2004, 2005)
report that transitions from (insecure) temporary jobs to (secure) “perma-
nent” jobs are associated with an increase in absenteeism. This pattern is
consistent with the hypothesis that workers perceive the risk of job loss as
positively correlated with absence from work, an hypothesis supported also
by the analysis in Hesselius (2002). Our framework allows for the possibility
that the probability of job loss depends on whether the employee is present
or absent from work.
The analysis oﬀers a number of results regarding the impact of social in-
surance beneﬁts and other determinants of workers’ and ﬁrms’ behavior. For
example, higher statutory sick pay is shown to increase absenteeism but also
to reduce wage costs; the eﬀect on employment is ambiguous. Higher non-
employment beneﬁts lead to lower employment but also higher absenteeism
among employed workers. Our normative analysis identiﬁes externalities as-
sociated with ﬁr m - p r o v i d e ds i c kp a ya n de x a m i n e st h ew e l f a r ei m p l i c a t i o n s
of alternative policies. We provide conditions under which publicly provided
and ﬁr m - p r o v i d e ds i c kp a ya r ee q u i v a l e n ti nw e l f a r et e r m s . W ea l s os h o w
that there can be non-trivial welfare gains associated with beneﬁtd i ﬀeren-
tiation across states of non-work, i.e., sickness absence, unemployment, and
nonparticipation.
The model is described in section 2 of the paper. We begin by a brief
overview before proceeding to the details, i.e., workers’ optimization, ﬁrms’
optimization and the general equilibrium of the economy. We also present
a numerical version of the model. Section 3 presents analytical as well as
numerical comparative statics results. Section 4 turns to welfare analyses
where we compare the welfare properties of government-provided and ﬁrm-
provided sick pay and examine the eﬀects of beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation across
states of non-work. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Overview
A brief overview of the model runs as follows. There is a ﬁxed number
of inﬁnitely lived and risk averse individuals who can occupy one of four
states, namely work, sickness absence, unemployment and nonparticipation.
Work and absence represent employment, whereas unemployment and non-
participation represent nonemployment. Each state is associated with a
present discounted value of utility. This value depends on income in the
current state as well as incomes in the other potential states, since choice
4and chance trigger movements across states.
Employed workers are subject to a risk of job loss that may diﬀer de-
pending on whether the worker is present at work or absent from work.
The state-speciﬁc ﬁring risks are exogenous to the worker but the average
ﬁring probability is endogenous as a result of the worker’s absence deci-
sion. The average ﬁring probability corresponds to the fraction of employed
workers that enter nonemployment in each period. A nonemployed worker
must engage in active and costly search in order to obtain a job oﬀer. The
probability of job ﬁnding depends on labor market tightness, i.e., the ra-
tio between vacancies and unemployment; the tighter the labor market, the
easier to match with a ﬁrm.
Individuals are exposed to random shocks that aﬀect the disutility of
work and search and the optimal decision rules involve cut-oﬀ values for
sickness. Suﬃciently severe sickness induces the employee to choose absence
rather than work; analogously, the nonemployed individual prefers nonpar-
ticipation to costly search for suﬃciently severe sickness. These reservation
values of sickness, which may diﬀer between employed and nonemployed
individuals, depend on beneﬁts and other parameters of the model.
Firms oﬀer wage and employment opportunities, and possibly sick pay
as well, in order to maximize expected proﬁts. When a ﬁrm announces its
compensation package, it realizes that a more attractive package will bring
about a longer queue of job applicants. There is free entry of ﬁrms and zero
proﬁts hold in equilibrium. The general equilibrium of the economy involves
the simultaneous determination of labor market tightness, wages and a host
of other variables, including employment, absenteeism, unemployment and
nonparticipation.
2.2 Workers’ Behavior4
The number of individuals is normalized to unity. Individuals are homoge-
nous ex ante, i.e., before they have been hit by shocks to their utility func-
tions and ended up in particular labor market states. The four states are
as follows: p is present at work (or simply work), s is sickness absence (sick
leave), u is unemployment, and n is nonparticipation. Work and sickness
absence represent employment (e), whereas unemployment and nonpartici-
pation are referred to as nonemployment (o). We think of nonparticipants
as “inactive” nonemployed individuals who belong the potential labor force
4The supply side of the model is described in more detail in Appendix A and Holmlund
(2005).
5but do not actively pursue job search.5 Let j indicate the labor force state,
j ∈ {p,s,u,n}.
The worker’s utility is taken to be quasi-linear of the form
υj =l nCj − ajξ (1)
where Cj is consumption, aj a positive parameter, and ξ au t i l i t ys h i f t e r
that is increasing in sickness. Successive ξ are independently and identically
distributed random variables drawn from a known distribution F(ξ) with
support (0,∞) and density f(ξ). Consumption is equal to after-tax income
in every period.6 Consumption while at work (wage income) is given as
Cp = w, and work-hours are taken as ﬁxed. The individual is entitled
to non-work beneﬁts when he does not work; the levels of these beneﬁts
may diﬀer across the three states of non-work. An employed worker who
is absent from work receives sickness beneﬁts (sick pay), Cs = ρsw,w h e r e
ρs is the replacement rate that applies to the wage in the ﬁrm where the
worker is employed. The replacement rate may be exogenously given by law
or determined by the ﬁrm as part of its optimal compensation package.
An unemployed person receives unemployment beneﬁts, Cu = bu,a n d
nonparticipants receive what is referred to as sickness assistance, Cn = bn.
Each ﬁrm takes bu and bn as exogenous to its wage decisions, although these
beneﬁt levels are in fact indexed to the average wage in the economy through
exogenously given replacement rates, ρu and ρn. The general equilibrium
features a common economy-wide wage. Beneﬁtd i ﬀerentiation between the
unemployed and the nonparticipants is feasible only if search eﬀort can be
monitored by the labor market authorities. If monitoring is impossible, there
is only room for a uniform replacement rate for nonemployed workers, i.e.,
ρu = ρn ≡ ρo.
We set aj =1 as normalization for j ∈ {s,n}, i.e., for “inactive” in-
dividuals who don’t work or don’t search. We set aj > 1 for j ∈ {p,u},
i.e., for “active” individuals who are present at work or who are unem-
ployed. Superscript j is dropped in the subsequent exposition, thus assum-
ing ap = au = a>1. The assumptions concerning aj capture the idea that
the disutility of work or search is increasing in sickness. To illustrate this
5Our nonparticipants are close to a category often referred to as “latent” job searchers
in labor force surveys, i.e., nonparticipants that report that they wish to work but fail to
meet the search criteria for being classiﬁed as unemployed.
6We thus rule out the possibility of smoothing consumption through borrowing and
saving, a simpliﬁcation done for tractability. Analytical treatments of equilibrium search
models with risk aversion and precautionary savings have proved to be highly complex
and few results are available. See Costain (1997) for a numerical analysis.
6idea, suppose that the utility function takes the form υj =l nCj −(1+ζj)ξ,
where ζj represents eﬀort devoted to work or to search. We thus have ζj =0
(a =1 )for j = s, n and ζj > 0( a>1) for j = p, u.
The probability of job loss may diﬀer between workers who are present
at work and workers on sick leave. Let φp denote the job loss probability
for a person at work and φs the corresponding probability for a person on
sick leave. Assume that work can never be more risky than sick leave, i.e.,
φp ≤ φs. Equal separation risks, i.e., φp = φs = φ, may correspond to a
stringent employment protection legislation.7
We assume that job ﬁnding requires active search and let α denote the
probability of job ﬁnding when searching. Job ﬁnding depends on labor
market conditions and we make the usual assumption that it is increasing
in the ratio between vacancies, v, and unemployment, u, i.e., α = α(v/u)=
α(θ) where θ ≡ v/u. The probability that a ﬁrm with a vacancy ﬁnds a
worker is given as q(θ)=α(θ)/θ by virtue of a constant returns to scale
matching function.
Individual optimization involves choosing reservation values of sickness.
Let Q denote the value of ξ that equalizes the value to the employed worker
of being present and absent at work. Analogously, let R denote the value of ξ
that equalizes the value to the nonemployed worker of being an unemployed
job seeker and a nonparticipant. The probability of being present at work
is thus F(Q) whereas the probability of being searching when nonemployed
is F(R).
Let Me and Mo denote the expected present values of employment (e)
and nonemployment (o) given that optimal decision rules are adhered to in
the future. These values can be written as asset equations of the form:
rMe =˜ υe + ˜ φ(Mo − Me) (2)
rMo =˜ υo +˜ α(Me − Mo) (3)
where ˜ φ ≡ φpF(Q)+φs [1 − F(Q)] = ˜ φ(Q) is the average ﬁring rate, ˜ α ≡
F(R)α(θ)=˜ α(R,θ) the average hiring rate, and ˜ υe (˜ υo) the expected per-
period utility if employed (nonemployed). Per-period utilities are given as
˜ υe ≡ F(Q)[lnw − aE(ξ | ξ ≤ Q)] + [1 − F(Q)][lnρsw − E(ξ | ξ>Q )]
˜ υo ≡ F(R)[lnρuw − aE(ξ | ξ ≤ R)] + [1 − F(R)][lnρnw − E(ξ | ξ>R )]
7A somewhat similar idea is contained in Wang and Williamson (1996), who assume
that a worker’s probability of job retention depends on eﬀort supplied on the job.
7where E stands for the expectations operator and where we have imposed the
replacement rate conditions also for the nonemployed workers, i.e., bu = ρuw
and bn = ρnw; recall that the latter replacement rates apply to the common
aggregate wage. The diﬀerence in present values is
Me − Mo =
˜ υe(ρs) − ˜ υo(ρu,ρ n)
˜ α(R,θ)+˜ φ(Q)+r
(5)
The reservation values of sickness, Q and R, are obtained from equations
of the form:
(a − 1)Q = −lnρs +( φs − φp)
∙




(a − 1)R =l nρu − lnρn + α(θ)
∙




Individual optimization implies that Me and Mo are locally independent
of the relevant reservation values of sickness. Note also that Me − Mo is
independent of the wage, an implication of constant replacement rates.
Eqs. (6) and (7) have several interesting implications. Both Q and
R depend in general on compensation while nonemployed as well as labor
market conditions. Non-work beneﬁts have direct eﬀects, holding Me −Mo
constant; they have also indirect “wealth eﬀects” through Me − Mo.T h e
indirect eﬀects sometimes tend to oﬀset and sometimes tend to reinforce
the direct eﬀects. For example, a rise in ρs has a direct negative eﬀect
on Q, whereas the indirect eﬀects works in the opposite direction (since
higher sick pay increases the value of employment relative to the value of
nonemployment). The direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect.8 Ar i s e
in ρu has a direct positive eﬀect on R, whereas the indirect eﬀect tends
to reduce R (since the value of employment falls relative to the value of
nonemployment). The direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect also in this
case.9 The following partial equilibrium results are obtained:

















8The employed worker spends only a fraction, 1 − F(Q), of his time as absent
from work, a fact that attenuates the wealth eﬀect. The wealth eﬀect is also smaller,
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< 0.
9The worker spends a only fraction, F(R), of his time as nonemployed as active job




1 − ˜ α/(˜ α + ˜ φ + r)
l
> 0.
8where ∂Q/∂ρo and ∂R/∂ρo denote the eﬀects of simultaneous increases of
ρu and ρn. The weak inequalities hold as equalities when φp = φs.
Lemma 2: An increase in labor market tightness aﬀect Q and R as
given by ∂Q/∂θ ≤ 0 for φp ≤ φs, and ∂R/∂θ > 0.
It is also clear from (6) that Q is increasing in (φs − φp);t h el a r g e rt h e
excess ﬁring risk associated with absence, the larger is Q, i.e., the lower is
the probability of being absent from work. Empirical evidence suggests that
absenteeism increases in labor market tightness, an observation consistent
with ∂Q/∂θ < 0 (implied by φs >φ p). Pro-cyclical labor force participation,
for which there is ample evidence, is consistent with ∂R/∂θ > 0.
This completes the description of the supply side where labor market
tightness is taken as given. We now turn to the behavior of ﬁrms and the
determination of wages and tightness.
2.3 Zero Proﬁts
From now on we ignore discounting (r =0 ) and consider a ﬁrm with po-
tentially many workers. The fraction of workers present at work is given
by F(Q) whereas the fraction absent is 1 − F(Q).T h e ﬁrm is operating
under constant returns to labor and y denotes the constant marginal prod-
uct. The wage cost per employee at work, inclusive of the payroll tax t,
is wc = w(1 + t).T h e r e i s a c o s t k of holding a vacancy open. The ﬁrm
maximizes proﬁt per employed worker and free entry drives proﬁts to zero.
Because of constant returns, the level of employment at the ﬁrm level is
indeterminate.
The ﬁrm’s proﬁts per employed worker can be written as




where k˜ φ/q(θ) is the cost of holding vacancies open; note that ˜ φ/q(θ) is the
vacancy/employment ratio in the ﬁrm that holds in a steady state with con-
stant employment. We assume in general that the cost of holding a vacancy
open is proportional to output per worker, i.e., k = κy. The parameter τ
is referred to as the degree of experience rating of sickness insurance, thus
borrowing from the US terminology regarding the ﬁnancing of unemploy-
ment insurance. With τ =1 ,t h eﬁrm fully ﬁnances sick pay for its workers;
with τ =0 ,t h eﬁrm ﬁnances nothing (directly) of its workers’ sick pay. It
is assumed that ﬁr m - p r o v i d e ds i c kp a yi st a x e da tt h es a m er a t ea sw a g e s .
We will generally consider two polar cases, viz. τ =1and τ =0 .
Free entry with zero proﬁts implies:




We will typically focus on two alternative versions of this zero proﬁt
condition:
(i)S i c kp a y( ρs) is provided by the government and exogenous to the
ﬁrm. The natural benchmark regarding ﬁnancing is τ =0 ,i . e . ,ﬁnancing
exclusively by taxes. We allow absence dependent ﬁring risks, i.e., φs ≥ φp
and thus ˜ φ = ˜ φ(Q).
(ii) Sick pay is provided exclusively by ﬁrms and ﬁnanced by them di-
rectly, i.e., τ =1 . To simplify this analysis, we assume φp = φs = φ and
thus ˜ φ = φ. Absence from work has thus no consequences for the risk of job
loss in this case.10
The zero proﬁt condition involves Q as obtained from (6). By making
use of (6) and diﬀerentiate the zero proﬁt condition we can state a useful
lemma:
Lemma 3: If ρs is exogenous to the ﬁrm, the zero proﬁt condition
implies a negative relationship between the wage cost, wc,a n dl a b o rm a r k e t
tightness, θ, i.e., ∂wc/∂θ < 0.
Eq. (9) is a Pissarides-type zero proﬁt condition, slightly modiﬁed so
as to incorporate absence behavior (see Pissarides, 2000). The zero proﬁt
relationship is downward sloping because a tighter labor market is associated
with higher vacancy costs which has to be oﬀset by lower wage costs so as to
maintain zero proﬁts. Absence appears in this relationship because it aﬀects
the surplus associated with more employed workers, and possibly the direct
costs of having more workers absent from work (if τ>0).
2.4 Wage Posting
Our model of wage setting involves directed search with wage posting by
ﬁrms. Firms post wages so as to attract job applicants, recognizing that
higher wages attract a longer “queue” of applicants. The inverse of tight-
ness, i.e., θ−1 = u/v, can be thought of as the length of the queue. Unem-
ployed workers allocate themselves to ﬁrms, recognizing wage oﬀe r sa sw e l l
as job oﬀer probabilities. Worker mobility across job queues (or submarkets)
equalizes the expected values across those queues and ﬁrms take as given
10Sickness insurance schemes exhibit marked variations across countries. Most countries
outside the United States have publicly provided sickness insurance. The level of statutory
sick pay relative to average earnings is very low in some countries (such as the United
Kingdom), but very high in other countries (such as Scandinavia).
10the common expected value of being unemployed. The model is thus of the
competitive search variety; see Moen (1997) for a seminal contribution and
Rogerson et al (2005) for a recent survey.11
Does a worker’s sickness status, as measured by ξ,a ﬀect his preferences
over job queues? Given our assumptions, the answer is no. At the beginning
of each period, the worker draws a fresh value of ξ from the distribution
F(ξ). The instantaneous utility impliedb yap a r t i c u l a rr e a l i z a t i o no fξ
is given by υu (bu,ξ)=l nbu − aξ. The worker directs his search to a ﬁrm
(submarket) after ξ is realized. The value function for an unemployed worker
who considers a submarket oﬀering a particular w,θ-pair can be written as:
(1 + r)U(ξ,θ,w)=υu (bu,ξ)+α(θ)Me(w)+[ 1− α(θ)]Mo (10)
where U(ξ,θ,w) is the present value of being unemployed given sickness
status ξ (see Appendix A). U(.) depends on ξ only through υu (bu,ξ) since
t h ew o r k e rd r a w san e wv a l u eo fξ in the next period. It follows that the
worker’s preferences over job queues is independent of the current sickness
status since ξ is analogous to a sunk cost. What matters for the choice of job
q u e u ei st h ev a l u eo ft h ew,θ-pair on oﬀer, as given by ˜ U ≡ α(θ)Me(w)+
[1 − α(θ)]Mo. This is the value of being unemployed before the veil of
ignorance regarding ξ has been lifted.
A ﬁrm that wants to stay competitive in the labor market must oﬀer
its workers a w,θ-pair that is no less attractive than the best alternative
available in the market. Let ¯ U denote the value of the most attractive
oﬀer. A competitive w,θ-pair must respect the inequality ˜ U ≥ ¯ U.N o t e
that this market restriction, written as an equality, is equivalent to ¯ U =
Mo +˜ α(θ)[˜ υe(w) − rMo]/˜ φ. The Lagrangian for the ﬁrm’s problem can
then be written as
L = π(.)+µ
∙
¯ U − Mo −
˜ α(θ)[˜ υe(w) − rMo]
˜ φ
¸
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrm takes ¯ U − Mo as exogenous
and maximizes with respect to w and θ.T h eﬁrst-order conditions take the
form:
πw = µ˜ α(θ)˜ υe
w/˜ φ (11)
πθ = µ[˜ υe(w) − rMo]˜ αθ/˜ φ (12)
which imply that the marginal rates of substitution between w and θ are
equal for ﬁrms and workers. The two ﬁrst-order conditions can be combined
11For ease of exposition, we suppress submarket subscripts on w and θ.
11with (9) to yield:










where πg ≡ π+κy˜ φ/q(θ) is gross proﬁts per employee and η ≡− θq0(θ)/q(θ)
is the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment, η ∈ (0,1).T h e












− τ [1 − F(Q)]ρs
(14)
T h em o r ee l a s t i cp r o ﬁts are with respect to the wage, the lower com-
pensation given to the worker and the lower the worker’s utility while em-
ployed, ˜ υe. Inspection of (14) reveals that this elasticity is nondecreasing in
ρs, recognizing also that Q = Q(ρs):
Lemma 4: The absolute value of the elasticity of gross proﬁts with







/∂ρs ≥ 0 as τ ≥ 0
The following partial equilibrium result is then immediate from (13) and
(14) in conjunction with Lemma 4:
Lemma 5: Higher sick pay reduces the wage, i.e., ∂w/∂ρs < 0.
Higher sick pay allows the ﬁrm to reduce the wage without violating the
market restriction as given by ˜ U ≥ ¯ U. T oa r r i v ea tag e n e r a le q u i l i b r i u m
relationship we must recognize that rMo is endogenous and inﬂuenced by
sick pay and labor market conditions. We use the fact that
˜ υe − rMo =
∙





W (wc,ρ s,R,θ) ≡ (16)













The equation involves four endogenous variables: wc,θ,Q and R;a n d
possibly ρs as well. We can use (6) and (7) to substitute out Q and R,
recognizing Q = Q(θ) and R = R(θ),w i t hQ0(θ) ≤ 0 and R0(θ) > 0.B y
12diﬀerentiating (16), we obtain a positive relationship between wc and θ,f o r
given ρs. Eq. (16) can be thought of as a positively sloped “wage curve” in
the wc,θ-space.
An alternative useful representation of this relationship is obtained by
invoking (9) to substitute out wc:
ˆ W (ρs,θ) ≡








F(Q)q(θ) − κ˜ φ(Q)
¸
=0 (17)
where F(Q)q(θ) − κ˜ φ(Q) > 0 from (9). This equation determines θ as a
function of parameters when ρs is exogenous; recall Q0(θ) ≤ 0 and R0(θ) > 0.
Existence requires ˜ υe − ˜ υo > 0,i . e . ,Me >M o; this restriction puts some
restrictions on the parameters that are assumed to be fulﬁlled. Uniqueness is
guaranteed by the fact that ˆ Wθ < 0. The wage cost is obtained by invoking
the zero proﬁt condition, i.e., (9). In summary:
Lemma 6: Free entry and zero proﬁts together with wage posting yield —
for a given ρs — av e r t i c a lwc,θ-locus that determines tightness independently
of the wage cost, i.e., eq. (17). The wage cost is obtained recursively from
the zero proﬁt condition, i.e., eq. (9).
We note that the tax rate and the degree of experience rating do not
appear in (17) and thus do not aﬀect the equilibrium level of tightness.
The level of labor productivity is also neutral with respect to tightness, an
implication of the assumption that vacancy costs are proportional to labor
productivity, k = κy.
The general equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1. Eqs. (16) and (17)
are alternative representations of the “wage curve”. For some comparative
statics purposes, one representation may be more useful than the other; of
course, the results do not depend on which curve that is invoked.
2.4.1 Firm-Provided Sick Pay
Consider now the case where sickness beneﬁt sa r ep r o v i d e db yt h eﬁrm as
part of the optimal compensation package. When the ﬁrm chooses ρs,i t
recognizes that absence responds to sick pay. That is, the ﬁrm takes into
account (6). As noted above, we simplify this analysis by assuming φp = φs
and thus have (a − 1)Q = −lnρs. Maximization of the Lagrangian with
respect to ρs yields a ﬁrst-order condition analogous to (11) of the form:







Figure 1: General equilibrium









which equalizes the marginal rates of substitution between wages and sick
pay for the ﬁrm and the worker. The former rate is aﬀected by the degree
of experience rating; the latter is not. The eﬃciency condition given by
(19) traces out a positively sloped “contract curve” in the w,ρs-space. The
contract curve is aﬀected by taxes and experience rating and can be written
as an equation of the form:







F (Q)+εs =0 (20)






is the elasticity of the absence rate, sr, with respect to the replacement rate.
Absent moral hazard we have εs =0and full insurance, i.e., ρs =1 , under
full experience rating, i.e., τ =1 ; this is of course a natural outcome with
risk averse workers and risk neutral ﬁrms.
14We assume that the elasticity εs is locally constant. In fact, εs is every-





To determine the general equilibrium conﬁguration of θ,wc and ρs,w e
need to invoke (20) together with (9) and (17), i.e., Z(wc,ρ s,θ)=0and
ˆ W (ρs,θ)=0 . Existence can be shown to hold for some parameter con-
ﬁgurations but we have not been able to derive simple and transparent
conditions for existence. However, provided that an equilibrium exists, it
will be unique. Hence:
Lemma 7: The general equilibrium of an economy where ﬁrms post both
wages and sick pay will be unique and determine θ, wc and ρs.
Proof:( Sketch - see Appendix B for more details.) Combine (20) and
(9) to obtain a relationship ˜ Γ(θ,ρs)=0 , where (∂θ/∂ρs)˜ Γ < 0. Combine
also ˜ Γ(θ,ρs)=0and (17) to obtain a relationship ˜ W(θ,ρs)=0 , where
(∂θ/∂ρs) ˜ W R 0. It can be shown that (∂θ/∂ρs)˜ Γ < (∂θ/∂ρs) ˜ W.T h e t w o
relationships between θ and ρs can cross only once and an equilibrium that
determines θ and ρs is therefore unique. The wage cost, wc, follows from
(9) once θ and ρs are determined. ¥
T h ed e g r e eo fe x p e r i e n c er a t i n g ,τ,m a ya ﬀect the level of tightness when
sick pay is provided by ﬁrms. Experience rating is eﬀectively a tax on sick
pay and the ﬁrm’s optimal compensation package responds to this tax.
2.5 Flow Equilibrium and Balanced Budget
Having determined wc, θ, Q and R, and possibly ρs as well, it is straightfor-
ward to determine average hiring and ﬁring rates, i.e., ˜ α(R,θ) and ˜ φ(Q),a s
well as the sickness absence rate, sr(Q). The stocks of employment, sickness
absentees, unemployed and nonparticants are obtained by imposing ﬂow








˜ α + ˜ φ
´
= F(Q)e
s =˜ α[1 − F(Q)]/
³
˜ α + ˜ φ
´
=[ 1− F(Q)]e
u = ˜ φF(R)/
³
˜ α + ˜ φ
´
= F(R)(1 − e)
n = ˜ φ[1 − F(R)]/
³
˜ α + ˜ φ
´
=[ 1− F(R)](1 − e)
15ur = ˜ φF(R)/
h
˜ α + ˜ φF(R)
i
sr =1 − F(Q)
where ur = u/(u+e) is the unemployment rate as conventionally measured.
The tax rate, t, is determined recursively to balance the government’s
budget, assuming a given degree of experience rating, τ:
t(p + τρss)=( 1− τ)ρss + ρuu + ρnn (24)
2.6 Calibration of the Model
We have calibrated the model assuming that the density f(ξ) is exponential,
i.e., f(ξ)=λexp(−λξ), λ>0. The absence rate is then given as sr =
exp(−λQ).S i n c e Q = −lnρs/(a − 1) when φp = φs,w eh a v elnsr =
[λ/(a − 1)]lnρs in this case. The parameters λ and a enter into the model
through the ratio λ/(a−1), i.e., the elasticity of sr with respect to ρs.W h e n







˜ α + φp
˜ α + ˜ φ
¶
which is smaller than λ/(a−1) since φp < ˜ φ. However, the diﬀerence between
φp and ˜ φ is negligible for realistic values of the absence rate (sr ≤ 0.1,s a y )
and λ/(a − 1) is therefore generally a good approximation of the elasticity.
We have set a =2and the choice of λ is then equivalent to choosing the
elasticity of sr with respect to ρs.
The exponential distribution is attractive because of its simplicity and its
apparent plausibility in this context: most sickness shocks are presumably
of a relatively small magnitude. We have chosen parameters so as to get
sr =0 .10, which corresponds to work hours lost due to absence as a fraction
of contractual hours among Swedish employees in 2004, excluding absence
due to holidays and similar “predetermined” causes of absence.12 We set
λ =2, arguably on the high side of estimates of dlnsr/dlnρs,a n dr e q u i r e
ar a t h e rl o wv a l u ef o rρs to get sr =0 .10.( N o t et h a tsr is decreasing in εs
for given ρs.) We have set ρs = ρu = ρn =0 .325, which yields an absence
rate around 10 percent.13
12Sickness absence accounts for over 90 percent of this measure of absence. Source:
Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden.
13Replacement rates around 30 percent may seem implausibly low. However, these
16The other parameters were chosen so as to get an unemployment rate of
6.5 percent and an average annual job separation rate of roughly 25 percent.
Consistency with empirical observations also requires that the expected du-
ration of unemployment, 1/α(θ), should be substantially higher than the
expected duration of vacancies, 1/q(θ). Moreover, some (scanty) empirical
evidence suggests Q>R, implying less sickness reporting among employees
than among nonemployed workers.
Taking a day as the time unit, we set φp =0 .25/365, φs =0 .35/365,
y =1 , η =0 .5, κ =1 .85 and m =0 .015. The rate of time preference is
set to zero throughout. The implications of these choices are set out in the
ﬁrst column of Table 1. Sickness absence is 10 percent and unemployment
is 6.5 percent of the labor force. The expected duration of unemployment is
close to 14 weeks whereas the expected duration of vacancies is 6.6 weeks.
The average (annual) separation rate is 26 percent. The inactivity rate,
n/(n + u),i s0.12, thus slightly higher than sr (so we have Q>R ).
We have also repeated the exercise under the assumption that there is
no excess ﬁring risk associated with absence. That is, we set φp = φs =
0.26/365, which corresponds to the average separation risk in the previous
speciﬁcation. All other parameters are the same. As is clear from Table 1,
the results are very similar.
The third column of Table 1 shows the outcomes when sick pay is en-
dogenously provided by ﬁrms (and τ =1 ). All relevant parameters are those
that apply in the second column of the table. It turns out that the opti-
mal sick pay chosen by ﬁrms is somewhat lower than the benchmark case
(0.257 as opposed to 0.325). Workers are compensated for the lower level of
sick pay by higher wages. The lower level of sick pay implies lower sickness
absence than in the previous cases. The other outcomes are close to those
given in the ﬁrst two columns.
rates pertain to systems without time limits, whereas existing systems generally involve
time limits on beneﬁt receipt. Existing systems also involve some degree of monitoring of
sickness status and job search, something that will tend to make higher replacement rates
feasible.
17Table 1. Calibration of the model.
Exogenous ρs Endogenous ρs
φs >φ p φs = φp φs = φp
ρs —— .257
wc .933 .933 .918
w. 876 .874 .894
θ. 473 .470 .482
e. 927 .927 .927
p. 834 .829 .866
s. 093 .098 .061
u. 064 .064 .063
n. 009 .009 .009
ur .065 .064 .064
sr .100 .106 .066
1/α(θ) (in weeks) 13.81 3 .91 3 .7
1/q(θ) (in weeks) 6.66 .56 .6
˜ φ (annualized) .260 .260 .260
3 Comparative Statics
The parameters of the model have their origins in preferences and shocks to
preferences, vacancy costs, matching technologies, job separation rates and
beneﬁt policies. Changes in parameters impact on the economy by inﬂu-
encing workers’ decisions on absence and search and by inﬂuencing ﬁrms’
decisions on wages and recruitments. Some disturbances may aﬀect hirings
and ﬁrings in opposite directions. Some will aﬀect both the wage setting
and zero proﬁt relationships; it may be possible to predict the wage outcome
but not the eﬀect on labor market tightness, or vice versa.
Table 2 presents comparative statics results, some of them analytical
and the remaining ones numerical. We conﬁne the discussion to a subset of
parameters, beginning with beneﬁt policies when sick pay is exogenous. To
provide some feel for how the model works, the discussion of the eﬀects of
higher sick pay is more detailed than the discussions of other experiments.
18Table 2. Comparative statics results.
ρs ρu ρn ρo κτ τ
(i)( ii)
R ++−−−0 −
Q (φs >φ p) −−−−+0
Q (φs = φp) − 00000+
θ −−−−−0+





s exog. ρs + −−−−0
s endog. ρs + − + −−
u +++++0 −
n − ++++0 +
ur +++++0 −
sr (φs >φ p) ++++− 0
sr (φs = φp) +0 0000 −
ρs +++−−
Notes: ρo involves a simultaneous increase in ρu and ρn. (i) corresponds
to exogenous ρs, (ii) to endogenous ρs.
3.1 Exogenous Sick Pay
Higher Sick Pay Consider how the economy responds to an exogenous
increase in sick pay, ρs,t h a ti sﬁnanced by taxes. Holding labor market tight-
ness constant, the eﬀect on Q, and thus on absence, is given by (6). The
direct eﬀect on Q is obviously negative. However, there is also a “wealth
eﬀect” involved since higher sick pay increases the value of employment rel-
ative to nonemployment, Me−Mo. The direct eﬀect dominates the indirect
eﬀect so Q does indeed fall; cf. Lemma 1 and footnote 8. The increase in
absence triggers an increase in ﬁrings (if φs >φ p) and thus contributes to a
decline in employment.
The fact that higher sick pay increases the value of employment rel-
ative to nonemployment strengthens the incentives for job search among
nonemployed individuals, as is clear from (7). By raising R,n o n e m p l o y e d
individuals substitute job search as unemployed for inactivity, thereby con-
tributing to a rise in hirings and an increase in employment. The net eﬀect
19on employment is generally unclear but positive when φs = φp;i nt h i sc a s e
there is no increase in ﬁr i n g sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hh i g h e rs i c kp a y .
So far we have taken labor market tightness as given. As is clear from (6)
and (7), both absence and search decisions depend in general on tightness.
Higher tightness reduces the value of employment relative to nonemployment
and makes the employed worker less reluctant to call in sick (Q falls). For
the nonemployed worker, a stronger labor market makes it more attractive
to engage in search and R thus increases; this follows from eq. (7). To
determine the eﬀect on labor market tightness, we need to consider ﬁrms’
wage and recruitment decisions.
Ar i s ei nρs that increases absence reduces the ﬁrm’s surplus per worker;
cf. (9). To maintain zero proﬁts, ﬁrms oﬀer fewer jobs thereby reducing
expected vacancy costs. The process can be illustrated as a shift to the left
of the zero proﬁt condition in the wc,θ-space. However, the higher level of
sick pay also aﬀects wage setting via the associated increase in the value of
employment relative to nonemployment. In that respect, higher sick pay is
equivalent to a subsidy to employment and ﬁrms can sustain recruitments
with lower wages. The wage curve as given by (16) shifts to the right. The
wage cost falls unambiguously and the worker’s real consumer wage also falls
as long as the tax rate does not decrease.
The eﬀect on tightness is ambiguous. The wage moderation eﬀect is
counteracted by the adverse labor demand eﬀect as higher absence reduces
the ﬁrm’s surplus per worker. Recall that we obtained an unambiguously
positive employment response to higher sick pay when φs = φp and tight-
ness was taken as given. This prediction does not carry over the case with
endogenous tightness: higher sick pay may reduce tightness which weakens
search incentives and reduces the average hiring rate, ˜ α(R,θ).14 The numer-
ical analysis suggests that tightness as well as employment would decline.
How does then sickness absence respond to higher sick pay? From
Lemma 1 we have ∂Q/∂ρs < 0, holding tightness constant. This eﬀect,
implying higher absenteeism, may conceivably be oﬀset by changes in tight-
ness; recall ∂Q/∂θ ≤ 0 from Lemma 2. However, by invoking (6) and (17),
we can establish an unambiguous increase in absenteeism, regardless of how
tightness is aﬀected. In summary:
Proposition 1 Higher sick pay increases absenteeism, ∂sr/∂ρs > 0,a n d
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20reduces the wage cost, ∂wc/∂ρs < 0.
Higher Nonemployment Beneﬁts A uniform increase in nonemploy-
ment beneﬁts, ρo, causes an unambiguous decline in tightness; the prediction
follows immediately from (17). Search activity among nonemployed workers
falls unambiguously since eq. (7) implies ∂R/∂ρo < 0 and ∂R/∂θ > 0.S i c k -
ness absence among employees is not aﬀected as long as φp = φs, but will
unambiguously increase when φs >φ p. Note from (6) that the rise in nonem-
ployment beneﬁts tend to increase absenteeism (reduce Q) as the per-period
utility diﬀerence between employment and nonemployment increases. How-
ever, the fall in tightness reduces job ﬁnding which makes nonemployment
less attractive, which in turn makes absenteeism more costly. By invoking
(6) and (17), it is straightforward to establish that absenteeism does indeed
increase (Q falls when φs >φ p); the indirect eﬀect through adjustments in
tightness can never oﬀset the direct eﬀect.
The fall in tightness reduces job ﬁnding and the fact that Q can never
increase imply that ﬁrings can never fall. It is clear, then, that employment
must fall. To obtain the eﬀect on the wage cost, we need to invoke the zero
proﬁt condition, i.e., eq. (9). As long as φp = φs holds, there is no eﬀect
on this relationship; the shift to the left of the vertical wage curve given by
(17) implies an unambiguous increase in the wage cost. In general, the zero
proﬁt condition may shift in either direction and the eﬀect on the wage cost
is thus ambiguous. The numerical analysis suggests a positive eﬀect on the
wage cost. In summary:
Proposition 2 A rise in nonemployment beneﬁts reduces tightness, job
ﬁnding and employment: ∂θ/∂ρo < 0, ∂˜ α/∂ρo < 0 and ∂e/∂ρo < 0.S i c k -
ness absence and the average ﬁring rate increase if φs >φ p: ∂sr/∂ρo ≥ 0
and ∂˜ φ/∂ρo ≥ 0 as φs ≥ φp. The wage cost increases as long as φs = φp:
∂wc/∂ρo > 0 if φs = φp.
Higher Experience Rating I ti sc l e a rf r o m( 1 7 )t h a te x p e r i e n c er a t i n g
does not aﬀect tightness, ∂θ/∂τ =0 . It is therefore also neutral with respect
to employment. Experience rating is in this respect similar to general taxes;
recall that ∂θ/∂t =0 . The wage cost per labor input, i.e., wc = w(1 + t),
falls as τ increases but there is no eﬀect on the expected total labor cost
per employee, i.e., wT
c ≡ [F(Q)+τ [1 − F(Q)]ρs]wc. The real consumer
wage, w, remains unchanged; this result is obtained by using the zero proﬁt
condition and the government’s budget restriction to obtain an equation
that determines w independently of τ. Hence:
21Proposition 3 The degree of experience rating has no eﬀect on tightness,
employment and the real consumer wage: ∂θ/∂τ = ∂e/∂τ = ∂w/∂τ =0 .
Higher Vacancy Costs Ar i s ei nv a c a n c yc o s t s ,κ, causes an unambigu-
ous fall in tightness, an implication that is clear from eq. (17). Job ﬁndings
therefore fall and employment falls as long as φp = φs.W h e nφp <φ s,t h e
fall in tightness will reduce worker absenteeism and therefore reduce ﬁrings
as well as hirings; the net eﬀect on employment is then ambiguous. The
numerical analysis suggests that employment would fall.
The eﬀect on the wage cost depends also on how the zero proﬁt condition
is aﬀected. The “direct” eﬀect can be represented as a shift to the left in the
wc,θ-space; zero proﬁts require lower wage costs at a given level of tightness
when vacancy costs have increased. However, this eﬀect is potentially coun-
teracted by lower absenteeism among workers. However, it can be shown
that the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect.
Proposition 4 Higher vacancy costs reduce tightness, job ﬁnding and the
wage cost: ∂θ/∂κ < 0,∂ ˜ α/∂κ < 0, and ∂wc/∂κ < 0. Absenteeism and
ﬁrings fall if φs >φ p: ∂sr/∂κ ≤ 0 and ∂˜ φ/∂κ ≤ 0 as φs ≥ φp.E m p l o y m e n t
f a l l sa sl o n ga sφp = φs: ∂e/∂κ < 0 if φp = φs.
Cyclical Eﬀects As noted in the introduction, time series data from sev-
eral countries indicate pro-cyclical absenteeism. Our analysis involves com-
parisons of steady states and the model as it stands is not directly suitable
for studies of business cycle eﬀects. However, we have noted a positive
partial equilibrium association between sickness absence and labor market
tightness (Lemma 2), an association that it is tempting to interpret as a
cyclical eﬀect. But absenteeism and tightness are both endogenous vari-
ables and the covariations between the two generally depend on the origins
of the exogenous disturbances. Higher vacancy costs lead to lower tightness
as well as lower absenteeism, i.e., a positive covariation between tightness
and absence. However, higher nonemployment beneﬁts lead to lower tight-
ness but higher absenteeism, i.e., a negative covariation between tightness
and absence.
We have indexed vacancy costs to productivity, k = κy, a relationship
that may not hold in the short run. If we allow productivity to move without
aﬀecting k, it is clear that our model implies a positive covariation between
output, tightness and absenteeism. Productivity changes are presumably
more important for business cycle ﬂuctuations than changes in nonemploy-
ment beneﬁts. Pro-cyclical absenteeism would therefore seem to be the most
22plausible prediction from a suitably extended version of the model.
3.2 Firm-Provided Sick Pay
The ﬁrm’s optimal compensation package is aﬀected by all parameters of the
problem. The general equilibrium features three key endogenous variables
— θ, wc and ρs — and we need to invoke eq. (20) in addition to the other
relationships. We examine the labor market responses to exogenous changes
in nonemployment beneﬁts and in experience rating. Note that the ﬁring
probability is taken as independent of absence behavior in this case, an
assumption implying that the sickness absence rate is exclusively determined
by the level of sick pay relative to the wage, i.e., ρs.
Nonemployment Beneﬁts Higher nonemployment beneﬁts reduce tight-
ness, job ﬁnding and employment. More interesting is that the level of sick
pay also increases, which in turn leads to an increase in absenteeism. To
understand this result, consider (20) which can be viewed as a positively
sloped contract curve in the w,ρs-space. Higher nonemployment beneﬁts
reduce tightness and thereby the costs of holding vacancies open; this in
turn allows ﬁrms to pay higher wages as well as higher sick pay without vio-
lating the zero proﬁt constraint. The optimal adjustment can be thought of
as a movement along the positively sloped contract curve in the w,ρs-space.
T h er i s ei nn o n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁt sh a sm a d ei tm o r ee x p e n s i v ef o rﬁrms to
oﬀer job opportunities and they respond by oﬀering higher wages and sick
pay. In conclusion:
Proposition 5 A rise in nonemployment beneﬁts reduces tightness, job
ﬁnding and employment: ∂θ/∂ρo < 0,∂ ˜ α/∂ρo < 0 and ∂e/∂ρo < 0.T h e
level of sick pay provided by ﬁrms increases, ∂ρs/∂ρo > 0, which triggers
an increase in absenteeism, ∂sr/∂ρo > 0. The wage cost also increases:
∂wc/∂ρo > 0.
Proof (Sketch.) Combine (20) and (9) to obtain a relationship ˜ Γ(θ,ρs)=
0, where (∂θ/∂ρs)˜ Γ < 0; combine also ˜ Γ(θ,ρs)=0and (17) to obtain
a second relationship ˜ W(θ,ρs)=0 , where (∂θ/∂ρs) ˜ W R 0. Note that
(∂θ/∂ρs)˜ Γ < (∂θ/∂ρs) ˜ W (see Appendix B) and that ρo features only in the
second relationship. Diﬀerentiate with respect to ρo and obtain ∂ρs/∂ρo > 0
and ∂θ/∂ρo < 0. The other results follow by noting that job ﬁnding as well
as employment depends on tightness, that absence depends on sick pay, and
that (20) implies a positive relationship between ρs and wc.
23Experience Rating Consider next how the ﬁrm’s choice of sick pay re-
sponds to higher experience rating. Obviously, a reduction of τ below one
would imply a subsidy to ﬁrm-provided sick pay. The following result is
obtained by using a proof analogous to the proof of Proposition 5:
Proposition 6 Higher experience rating reduces sick pay, i.e., ∂ρs/∂τ < 0.
Since experience rating from the ﬁrm’s perspective is a tax on sick pay,
it is not surprising that ﬁrms respond by reducing sick pay. The eﬀects on
tightness and employment work through the induced eﬀe c t so ns i c kp a y ;t h e
direction of these eﬀects are generally ambiguous. Recall that the eﬀects
on tightness and employment from exogenously imposed increases in sick
pay were also ambiguous. However, the numerical analysis suggested that
tightness as well as employment would fall. Analogously, the numerical
analysis suggests that higher experience rating, via the induced fall in sick
pay, leads to an increase in tightness and employment.
4W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
Competitive search equilibria have been shown to be socially optimal under
some conditions; see Moen (1997) and Rogerson et al (2005). These results
do not obtain in our case where individuals are risk averse, credit markets are
imperfect and the government ﬁnances social insurance beneﬁts by means of
taxes. The presence of a social insurance system creates externalities that
operate through the government’s budget constraint. This section oﬀers an
analysis of these externalities and provides a quantitative comparison of the
welfare implications of alternative social insurance policies.
4.1 Private versus Public Provision of Sick Pay
Does ﬁrm-provided sick pay yield higher or lower compensation compared
to what a benevolent government would choose? We approach this issue
by asking whether a social planner can improve welfare by implementing a
small (inﬁnitesimal) change of sick pay at the privately optimal solution. To
facilitate this exercise, it is useful to reformulate the private solution so that
it mimics the decision problem facing the planner. This is accomplished
by means of a “dual” approach where the private equilibrium is viewed as
the result of a maximization of the worker’s expected utility against a zero
proﬁt constraint. This approach yields outcomes that are identical to those
obtained from the “primal” approach where proﬁts are maximized against an
expected utility constraint for the worker. We assume complete experience
24rating, i.e., τ =1 . Discounting is ignored so the relevant welfare objective
can be stated as the worker’s expected utility, i.e., Λ = e˜ υe +( 1− e)˜ υo.
It is useful to begin by invoking the zero proﬁt constraint, eq. (9), and
obtain tightness as a function of the wage cost and sick pay:
θ = θ(wc,ρ s),θ wc < 0,θ ρs < 0 (25)
which can be substituted into the worker’s objective function:
Λ = e[θ(wc,ρ s),R][˜ υe(w,ρs) − ˜ υo(w,ρo)] + ˜ υo(w,ρo) (26)
where e(.)=˜ α(θ)/[˜ α(θ)+φ]. Employment generally depends on search
eﬀort on the extensive margin, i.e., R, which in turns depends on tightness,
R = R(θ). However, this relationship can be ignored as long as we focus
on small (inﬁnitesimal) deviations from the privately optimal solution. The
worker’s expected utility is invariant to derivative changes of R,b yt h e
envelope theorem.
The ﬁrst-order conditions pertaining to the private solution can now be
written as:
Λw ≡ A =( ˜ υe − ˜ υo)eθθw + e˜ υe
w =0 (27)
Λρs ≡ B =( ˜ υe − ˜ υo)eθθρs + e˜ υe
ρs =0 (28)
which, as in the previous primal approach, imply equality between the ﬁrm’s
and the worker’s marginal rate of substitution between wages and sick pay.
The social planner contemplates a small increase in ρs at the prevailing
equilibrium and recognizes the government’s budget constraint
t =
ρo(1 − e)
F(Q)e +[ 1− F(Q)]eρs = t[ρs,Q(ρs),e(θ,R),ρ o] (29)
in addition to the zero proﬁt constraint; these two constraints together rep-
resent the aggregate resource constraint for the economy. The relevant ex-
pression is
dΛ

























dρs < 0 (31)
25where dt/dρs is the total derivative of the government’s budget restriction.
















The two terms on the right-hand side of (32) capture externalities associ-
ated with the tax system and the unemployment insurance system. The ﬁrst
term involves the tax externality: private agents do not internalize the fact
that their decisions aﬀect tax rates via the government’s budget constraint.
The second term captures what may be referred to as a “wage externality”:
private agents do not internalize the linkage between their wage decisions,
the aggregate wage, and the level of consumption during nonemployment.
Nonemployment beneﬁts are indexed to the aggregate wage, ˜ υo
w > 0;a b s e n t
this linkage, there would be no wage externality.
Is the privately chosen ρs t o ol o wo rt o oh i g h ?C l e a r l y ,dΛ/dρs > 0 would
imply that the private system yields too low sick pay, and vice versa. There is
a presumption that dt/dρs > 0, although this cannot be analytically veriﬁed;
this would pull in the direction of dΛ/dρs < 0.T h i s m a y b e o ﬀset by the
wage externality in so far as dw/dρs > 0. However, we ﬁnd dw/dρs < 0 in
our calibrated model; this result is also what we have obtained analytically
in partial equilibrium (cf. Lemma 5). We obtain dΛ/dρs < 0 when we
evaluate the derivative at our calibrated equilibrium with ﬁrm-provided sick
pay. This would suggest, then, that ﬁr m - p r o v i d e ds i c kp a yw o u l db et o o
generous relative to what a social planner would prefer.
Instead of asking whether ﬁrm-provided sick pay is set too low or too
high, we could ask if there are incentives for ﬁrms to oﬀe rs i c kp a yi na d -
dition to the statutory beneﬁts, if the latter were optimally chosen by the
government. To answer this question, we evaluate the derivative of the ﬁrm’s
objective function at the socially optimal level of government-provided sick
pay. We ﬁnd, as should be expected, that the sign of this derivative is the
negative of (32): if dΛ/dρs < 0,t h eﬁrm could thus increase its proﬁtb y
topping up the statutory sick pay. Indeed, in countries where statutory sick
pay involves relatively low replacement rates, as in the United Kingdom,
many employers have their own schemes which top up statutory sick pay.
The exercises so far involve “local” changes in sick pay, taking other
instruments as given. We proceed to an analysis of optimal policies that
makes use of all available instruments.
264.2 Optimal Policies
The problem facing the social planner is to maximize social welfare, which
involves maximization of the worker’s expected utility subject to a zero
proﬁt constraint and the government’s budget constraint. The social wel-
fare function is given by (26), which incorporates the zero proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t .
The government’s budget constraint with an arbitrary τ is given by (24),
recognizing that the chosen policies aﬀect the allocation of workers across
the four states, i.e., p, s, u and n.
We use as benchmark a policy with publicly provided sick pay and uni-
form replacement rates, i.e., τ =1and ρs = ρu = ρn. Column (1) in Table
3 shows the outcomes. The optimal uniform replacement rate is 0.31,w h i c h
is close the benchmark solution in Table 2 where ρs =0 .325 was assumed.
The other policies, displayed in columns (2) through (6), are as follows:
(2): Publicly provided sick pay with optimal diﬀerentiation of ρs and ρo;
(3): Publicly provided sick pay with optimal diﬀerentiation of ρs,ρ u and
ρn; (4): Privately provided sick pay with optimal ρo and τ =1 ;( 5 ) :P r i -
vately provided sick pay with optimal ρo as well as optimal τ; (6): Privately
provided sick pay with optimal ρu, ρn and τ.
The welfare eﬀect of a speciﬁc policy is measured relative to case (1). It
is expressed as the equivalent of a consumption tax that equalizes welfare
across policy regimes. Let ΛU represent welfare associated with reference
case (1) with uniform beneﬁts and ΛA welfare associated with an alternative
policy. The measure of the welfare gain of policy A relative to policy U is
given by the value of the tax rate z that solves ΛA [(1 − z)w;·]=ΛU.W i t h
logarithmic utility functions we have ∆Λ ≡ ΛA − ΛU = −ln(1 − z) ≈ z.
Table 3 immediately reveals that privately and publicly provided sick pay
are equivalent provided that the planner makes optimal use of experience
rating; cf. the outcomes in columns (2) and (5), and those in columns (3) and
(6). The planner can choose ρs directly, as in the public system; or ρs can
be controlled indirectly by means of τ, as in the private system. The welfare
implications are identical. The only variables that depend on private/public
regime are wc and t;h o w e v e r ,t h e s ee ﬀects are uninteresting since they do
not aﬀect consumption possibilities (lower t is oﬀset by higher τ so there
will no eﬀect on ﬁrms’ total labor costs).
The equivalence result can be stated formally as follows:
Proposition 7 Publicly provided optimal sick pay is welfare equivalent to
privately provided sick pay provided that the degree of experience rating is
chosen optimally.
27Proof Let X(ρs,τ) denote the solution vector of endogenous variables
in the system with public provision of sick pay. The key variables are de-
termined by eqs. (9) and (17). We have ∂X/∂τ =0by Proposition (3).
Consider next a system with ﬁrm-provided sick pay, where the key variables
are determined by eqs. (9), (17) and (20). We obtain ρs = ρs(τ),w i t h
∂ρs/∂τ < 0 by Proposition (5). Substitution of ρs = ρs(τ) into X(ρs,τ)
yields the vector X (ρs(τ),τ). The social planner maximizes Λ = Λ[X(ρs,τ)]
by choosing ρs directly, or indirectly via τ.T h er e l e v a n tﬁrst-order condi-
tion for the ﬁrst case (public provision) is ΛX (∂X/∂ρs)=0 ;n o t et h a t
ΛX (∂X/∂τ)=0is always satisﬁed. The ﬁrst-order condition for the second
case (private provision) is ΛX (∂X/∂ρs)(∂ρs/∂τ)+ΛX (∂X/∂τ)=0 ,w h i c h
can be written as ΛX (∂X/∂ρs)(∂ρs/∂τ)=0since (∂X/∂τ)=0 .I tf o l l o w s
that the solution vector for the two systems is identical.
Table 3. Welfare comparisons, private and public sick pay.
Publicly provided Privately provided
Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal ρo Optimal Optimal
uniform ρj ρs,ρ o ρs,ρ u,ρ n τ =1 ρo,τ ρ u,ρ n,τ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ρs .307 .228 .225 .262 .228 .225
ρo .307 .398 .397 .398
ρu .307 .398 .534 .397 .398 .534
ρn .307 .398 .170 .397 .398 .170
τ 111 11 .181 1.226
wc .931 .943 .951 .924 .929 .937
θ .501 .377 .285 .376 .377 .285
e .930 .911 .915 .911 .911 .915
p .842 .863 .869 .849 .863 .869
s .088 .048 .047 .063 .048 .047
u .062 .070 .081 .071 .070 .081
n .008 .019 .003 .018 .019 .003
ur .063 .072 .082 .072 .072 .082
sr .094 .052 .051 .069 .052 .051
t .058 .054 .063 .041 .038 .047
w .881 .895 .895 .888 .895 .895
∆Λ (%) 0.84 1.56 0.79 0.84 1.56
Notes: φp = φs in all simulations. The welfare changes are measured relative
to the optimal uniform public system.
28The government can thus “delegate” the decision on sick pay to ﬁrms,
provided that it exercises appropriate control over the degree of experience
rating. By choosing experience rating optimally, the government induces
the private agents to internalize all relevant externalities. As our numerical
results in Table 3 indicate, the optimal degree of experience rating involves
τ>1; ﬁrms should be charged with more than the full amount of their
expenditure on sick pay.
In the simulations reported in Table 3, a private system with optimally
chosen ρo and τ =1dominates a public system with optimal uniform re-
placement rates; the welfare gain amounts to 0.8 percent of consumption.
More substantial welfare gains are obtained by also diﬀerentiating between
ρu and ρn.T h ei n c r e a s ei nw e l f a r er e l a t i v et ot h er e f e r e n c ec a s ea m o u n t st o
1.6 percent of consumption. Note that the rankings of the optimal nonwork
replacement rates are ρu >ρ s >ρ n. There is a case for a relatively gener-
ous unemployment compensation since it provides incentives to substitute
active search for inactive nonparticipation Of course, this type of diﬀeren-
tiation presumes that monitoring of job search is feasible, at least to some
degree.15
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper has oﬀered a general equilibrium framework suitable for analyz-
ing absenteeism along with employment, unemployment and nonparticipa-
tion. Welfare policy interdependencies arises naturally in the model and
can be analyzed in a uniﬁed and coherent fashion. It comes as no surprise
that nonemployment beneﬁts have adverse employment eﬀects, but it is less
obvious that the propensity to be present at work also declines. Higher sick-
ness beneﬁts for employed workers result in higher absenteeism, as should
be expected. However, such policies will also generally aﬀect labor market
tightness, wages and employment. The details of the adjustments to pol-
icy changes can sometimes be determined analytically, but sometimes only
numerically. The need for “complementary calibrations” is pertinent in our
model as in other general equilibrium models of the labor market. However,
the credibility of the numerical exercises could be much improved if we had
access to better empirical knowledge about some key parameters.
In light of this, there is a need for more empirical work on the determi-
nants of sickness absence at the individual level. Although such research has
15The optimality of ρ
u >ρ
n can be shown to hold analytically in a simpliﬁed version of
the model with exogenous tightness and wages; see Holmlund (2005).
29been on the rise in recent years, the area is less well developed than research
on transitions between unemployment and employment. Better empirical
knowledge about individual responsiveness to changes of sick pay, or other
parameters of the sickness insurance system, is crucial for the design of pol-
icy. We also need a better understanding of ﬁrms’ behavior in this area,
including knowledge of how ﬁrms respond to alternative ﬁnancing schemes.
In European policy discussions, experience rating of sickness insurance has
sometimes been suggested as a means to encourage ﬁrms to oﬀer better
workplaces with lower absenteeism. Skeptics have noted that policies that
make absenteeism more costly to ﬁrms are likely to induce them to discrim-
inate against more sickness-prone individuals in their hiring decisions. To
our knowledge, there is so far very little relevant knowledge available that
can be used for policy evaluation and policy guidance in this area.
Appendix A. Value Functions
Time is discrete and future sickness status is uncertain. Tomorrow is another
day and each morning involves a draw from the distribution F(ξ).L e tP(ξ)
denote the expected present value of being present at work, S(ξ) the value
o fb e i n go ns i c kl e a v e ,U(ξ) the value of being unemployed, and N(ξ) the
value of being a nonparticipant. These present values are computed after
a particular realization of ξ and involves optimal behavior with respect to
future shocks. The value functions are written as follows:





































30The present value of being employed and working involves a ﬂow return
given by lnw −aξ as well as changes in utility caused by sickness and labor
market shocks. The probability of job loss is φp and the probability of
retaining the job is 1−φp. If the worker loses the job he decides whether to
choose unemployment or nonparticipation, i.e., he takes max[U(x),N(x)].
If the job is retained the choice is between work and sick leave and the worker
thus takes max[P(x),S(x)]. End-of-period discounting is applied at the rate
r>0. Analogous interpretations hold for the other value functions. Note
from (A3) and (A4) that job ﬁnding takes place only when unemployed; we
have thus ignored transitions from nonparticipation to employment.
The decision rules are such that suﬃciently serious sickness makes the
worker more inclined to prefer inactivity to activity, i.e., sick-leave is pre-
ferred to work and nonparticipation is preferred to unemployment. Consider
an individual at work who observes a new value of ξ and decides to remain
at work as long as ξ does not exceed a critical value, Q.T h a t i s , w o r k i s
chosen for ξ ≤ Q and sickness absence for ξ>Q . Analogous rules apply to
nonemployed individuals. Let R denote the critical value of sickness for a
nonemployed person. Search unemployment is chosen for ξ ≤ R and non-
participation for ξ>R . A reservation sickness strategy is optimal for the
employed worker when P(ξ) ≥ S(ξ) for ξ ≤ Q,a n dP(ξ) <S (ξ) for ξ>Q .







which guarantees the optimality of the reservation sickness rule since a>1.
For a nonemployed person, the optimality of the reservation sickness rule
requires that U(ξ) ≥ N(ξ) for ξ ≤ R,a n dU(ξ) <N(ξ) for ξ>R . U(·) and







so the inequality U0(ξ) <N 0(ξ) holds.
The reservation sickness conditions imply that we can deﬁne the follow-















where Me pertains to employment (work and sick leave) and Mo to nonem-
ployment (unemployment and nonparticipation). Me and Mo are ex ante
31expected present values of employment and nonemployment in the sense that
they correspond to present values before the veil of ignorance concerning ξ
is lifted, given that optimal decision rules are followed in the future. The
reservation sickness conditions, given by eqs. (6) and (7) in the main text,
are obtained by imposing the indiﬀerence condition P(Q)=S(Q) for the
employed worker and the analogous condition U(R)=N(R) for a worker
who is not employed. The maximum value functions can be written as con-
ventional asset value equations, as given by eqs. (2) and (3) in the text.
Appendix B: Uniqueness with Endogenous Sick Pay
The three equations that determine ρs,w c and θ are:







F (Q)+εs =0 (B1)




ˆ W (ρs,θ) ≡











where Q = Q(ρs). Our strategy is to substitute out wc so as to get a system
with two equations that determine ρs and θ. First, use (B1) and (B2) to get
a“ z e r op r o ﬁt contract curve” of the form:
˜ Γ(θ,ρs) ≡ [F (Q)+εs](1− τρs) −





where ˜ Γθ < 0 and ˜ Γρs < 0. As a second step, use (B3) in conjunction with
(B4) to get a “modiﬁed wage equation” of the form:
˜ W(θ,ρs) ≡
















where ˜ Wθ < 0 and ˜ Wρs R 0.


















< 0 and (∂θ/∂ρs) ˜ W = −
³
˜ Wρs/ ˜ Wθ
´
R 0.
After some tedious calculations it can be shown that this inequality does
indeed hold; the details are available on request. In graphical terms, the
slope of ˜ Γ(θ,ρs) is more negative in the θ,ρs-space than the slope of ˜ W(θ,ρs);
as noted, the slope of ˜ W(θ,ρs) can take either sign.
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